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Introduction 
The EITI is a standard for countries with oil, gas and minerals, it requires all companies extracting oil, 
gas and minerals to publish what they pay in taxes and royalties and the government also publish what 
it receives, including other key information about the sector (EITI, 2016). These mineral dependent 
economies generate at least 8 % of GDP and 40 % of export earnings from the mineral (Auty, 1993). 
The lack of accountability and efficient management of these resources has led to political unrest, 
poverty on a larger scale and by extension severe macroeconomic issues thereby impacting negatively 
on growth and development. Given the negative relationship between economic growth and resource 
abundance experienced in these countries termed “Resource Curse” or the “Paradox of Plenty 
(Ross,2001; Haglund, 2011; Gylfason and Zoega, 2001), civil society and NGOs have come up with 
several initiatives such as the Global Witness initiative, Publish What You Pay initiative and so many 
more (Acosta, 2010). These have not had real impact on accountability and efficient management of 
the resources.  
The extractive industries transparency initiative (EITI) was ushered in at the world summit on 
sustainable development in Johannesburg in September 2002 by the former United Kingdom Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair and was founded at a conference in London in 2003. Till date, 51 countries are 
implementing EITI and 31 countries are compliant with EITI requirements (EITI, 2016). The positive 
impact of EITI on these nations should ensure transparency, reduce corruption, and contribute to 
poverty reduction and achievement of the sustainable development goals (SDGs). It is, therefore 
pertinent to assess if these countries are benefiting from these initiatives and how they can further 
benefit. 
 
1.1 Mineral dependent economies and poverty 
The existence of countries with massive resources and poverty has led to debates on the relationship 
between mineral resources and development. Some researchers questioned the belief that mineral 
resources should lead to economic prosperity (Ross, 2001). For instance, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo which house about 34 percent and 13 percent of all the diamonds and coppers respectively in 
Africa and over $24 trillion worth of untapped raw mineral ore deposits has 90.73 percent of its 
population living under $1.90 a day, More so, Niger Republic supplies 44 percent of Africa’s uranium, 
yet has 76.5 percent of its population living under $3.10 a day (Africa Leadership, 2015; World Bank, 
2015). In addition, most of the conflicts and factors depressing growth and development in these 
countries have been traced to mineral dependency (Ross, 2003; USAID, 2005; Collier, 2006; Kucera 
et al., 2011; Carpenter, 2012; Maphosa, 2012; Berman et al., 2014).  The genesis of the inability of 
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these countries to transform the valued minerals to growth and development are corruption, lack of 
accountability and transparency, in addition to mismanagement.  
1.2 Dutch Diseases Syndrome  
The effect of mineral dependency is seen mostly on how it erodes the competitiveness of the 
manufacturing sector, which has high capacity to create jobs and technical advancement that should 
promote growth. Export of mineral resources lead to an appreciation of the local currency and make 
other sectors less competitive on the world market, through spending effect and resource movement 
effect (Brahmbhatt, Canuto, and Vostroknutova, 2010). 
 
Figure 1: Diagram explaining Dutch diseases syndrome  
 
Source: Author, 2016  
 
As seen in figure 1, mineral dependent countries witness a shift outward in exports (point A to B). This 
leads to massive foreign exchange and appreciation of the exchange rate in favour of the local currency.  
Since there is little or no value addition to these minerals, this leads to rent-seeking behavior and less 
competitiveness of the manufacturing sector, thereby causing wages to rise, promote mass importation 
and creating massive unemployment. This, in the long run shrinks the economy to point C.  
 
2.0 Assessing the impacts of EITI so far 
The number of implementing and compliant countries has been growing from only 4 countries - 
Nigeria, Azerbaijan, Ghana, and the Kyrgyz Republic to 51 and 31 countries respectively. Out of the 
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31countries classified as low-income economies (GNI per capita of $1,045 or less) and has majority 
of its population living below $1.90 a day (World Bank, 2016), 17 of them are EITI members, one has 
been suspended, while 4 have not met the EITI requirement, only 12 are confirmed to have met all 
EITI requirements as at March 2016. Using panel data from 1991 to 2014, a regression analysis of 
how mineral dependent affected growth and some development indicators (GDP growth rate, 
government expenditure on education, gross capital formation, government health expenditure and 
manufacturing value-added to GDP) before and after EITI membership was computed for 10 of these 
countries1. Using Burkina Faso as a base, the individual performance of each country in relation to the 
base country was assessed. Due to the individual country’s heterogeneity component in ui, a clustered 
standard error was used to make the estimated variance –covariance valid 
As a group, the results confirmed the negative relationship between GDP growth rate and mineral rents 
(-0.01765), which became positive after implementing EITI requirements (0.02067), although not 
significant at 5 percent level. This suggests that the impact of EITI has been positive for implement 
countries on GDP growth rate. Whereas, the relationship between government expenditure on 
education and mineral rent was positive prior to and after implementing EITI requirements. It was 
however weaker before (0.0080756), and slightly stronger after implementing EITI in addition to being 
significant (0.04905) at 1 percent level. This suggests that expenditure on education were not adequate 
before EITI came into place in these countries. More so, gross capital formation was negatively related 
to mineral rents (-0.0025105) before EITI in these countries and became positive and significant after 
being EITI compliant (0.07621) at 1 percent level. Expenditure on health was also found to be 
negatively related with mineral rents (-0.0056936) before EITI in these countries and became positive 
and significant after being EITI compliant (0.046158) at 1 percent level. The relationship between the 
Manufacturing sector Value-Added and mineral rent was observed to remain negative even after 
implementing EITI requirements. This suggests that EITI did not help countries diversify their revenue 
base but its aid them utilize their resources efficiently, as the performance of the manufacturing sector 
fell with increased mineral rents.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 due to the availability of data; only the ten countries used have reliable data 
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Figure 2: Trend of mineral rents and GDP growth rate; Burkina Faso, Chad, Dem.Rep of Congo and 
Guinea 
 
Source: Author, 2016 
 
Figure 3: Trend of mineral rents and GDP growth rate; Mali, Mozambique, Niger and Tanzania 
 
Source: Author, 2016 
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Figure 4: Trend of mineral rents and GDP growth rate; Togo and Sierra Leone 
 
 
Source: Author, 2016 
 
3.0 How mineral dependent economies can benefit from EITI 
The EITI focuses on government disclosing all receipts of payment from mineral rents. In same 
manner, companies in the mineral sectors are mandated to publish all payments, while an independent 
administrator verifies the tax and royalty payments. On the basis of these, an EITI report is published.  
While this is aimed at ensuring transparency and keeping the countries’ citizens informed, the 
dependent economies can benefit adequately from EITI given the following; 
High literate level in the mineral dependent economies 
Without the adequate ability of citizens to interpret the published information on mineral rents as 
expected by EITI and relate it to their daily lives, it will still be difficult for the citizenry to hold their 
governments accountable. Most of these poor countries have the highest illiteracy rate and political 
apathy in the world, thereby putting the masses at disadvantage compared to the few ruling elites. For 
instance, only 28.7% are educated in Niger, Guinea literacy rate is 30.4%, while chad has a literacy 
rate of 40.2% (UNICEF, 2013). The civil society should promote local awareness and easy 
interpretation of the reports (if possible, in local languages) detail enough for the non-educated people 
of these countries to understand. This enlightenment will empower citizens to demand accountability 
and translate the mineral rents into infrastructural development. 
Practical development traced to mineral earnings 
EITI should go beyond disclosing payments, but should also be extended to how these resources were 
expended. Detail information on the real impacts of mineral rents can also be submitted as part of EITI 
reports and made available to citizens in an understandable format. How many schools were built? 
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How many hospitals were constructed? Were the host communities presented with infrastructures and 
social facilities?  For instance, Nigeria has always been cleared by EITI as compliant country since 
2011, but these payment declarations and reports have never translated to better lives for the people of 
Niger delta, where the resources come from (Ebegbulem, Ekpe, and Adejumo, 2013), therefore, EITI 
did not drive reforms (Shaxson, 2009). Basically, the funds are still squandered after declaration of 
payment to EITI.  Demanding reports on tangible impact of this payments from compliant countries 
will enable citizens to properly assess how the mineral sector has positively impacted their lives. 
Existence of enforcement and Sanction machinery  
Apart from the fact that EITI membership is voluntary, EITI does not have strong mechanism in place 
to sanction erring countries and companies. The only punitive mechanism use by EITI is to suspend 
non-compliant countries.  For instance, Angola has refused signed up to the EITI and its government 
has been accused of missing billions of dollars generated through the oil sector. EITI has not been able 
to draw up incentives nor punitive measures to attract countries to the organization. In addition, 
Nigeria’ s 2005 audit report released in 2009 had a discrepancy of over $800 million of unresolved 
differences without any sanction from EITI (Baumüller et al., 2011). More compelling measures will 
help save billions of dollars that could have been channeled into provision of infrastructural facilities 
for the masses. 
Access to Information and communication technologies 
Due to the infrastructural decay in some of these mineral dependent countries, majority of the citizen 
lack access to information and communication technologies. So, the expected benefit of EITI to 
empower citizens through access to information is defeated. There is therefore need to make further 
make hard copies of reports available through the local civil society groups partnering with EITI or 
make available media where citizens can have access to these reports in the local offices of the civil 
society group in each of the participating countries.  
Local monitoring group 
The framework of corruption in some mineral dependent countries is usually in collaboration with 
mineral exploring companies (Amundsen, 2011, Dougherty, 2011). So, terming a country “a 
compliant” based on the agreement between what companies published as payment to governments 
and what government publish as receipt is not sufficient. The EITI can further benefit the poor in these 
mineral dependent countries with the presence of local monitoring groups that are free from 
intimidations and harassments. The civil society groups that attempted to assume this role in 
Azerbaijan were harassed without any protection from EITI nor was punitive measure against it 
(Human Rights Watch, 2015). 
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4.0 Weakness of EITI and policy Implications 
The weakness of EITI stem from its foundation as a voluntary initiative, thereby weakening its real 
impact on development in communities where mineral resources are explored.  Although it might not 
be totally feasible to instigate punitive measures against erring states, but working in collaboration 
with more existing international institutions such the United Nations, WTO etc. and creating more 
incentives to aid collaboration can be a way forward. Moreso, given the fact that the basis of 
establishing EITI was due to the divergence between mineral rents and development in mineral 
dependent countries, the EITI reports that only include revenues without assessing its real impact on 
developmental projects have not met its founders’ objectives. The implication of all these weakness is 
continued mismanagement and persistent gaps between mineral rents and development indicators. 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
The resources of a nation should be used for the growth and development of such nation, as well as 
the improvement of the citizens’ wellbeing. Corruption and mismanagement backed with lack of 
decent governmental institutions empowers the few elites in collaboration with some companies to 
waste these resources while subjecting majority to poverty and inhumane living conditions.  
The recent Panama files scandals shows that actors in oil, gas and mineral extraction countries can use 
secrecy such as shell companies to starve nations resources meant for its development. 
Transparency has been seen to be the mechanism to reduce corruption and corrupt practices. The new 
extractive industry transparency initiative was established to ensure transparency, If the world’s poor 
must benefit from its operations and initiatives, EITI boards should also focus on ensuring transparency 
on the provisions of the core amenities and social services that liberate the poor from poverty, such 
health care, schools and basic infrastructures, while further restructuring its framework to be in 
consonance with developments in these countries. 
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Appendix  
 
Table 1a: regression of GDP growth on Mineral rents after before joining EITI 
 
      Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     143 
                                                       F(  1,     9) =    0.29 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.6063 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0051 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .78081 
 
                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
  lnGdpGrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnMineralRent |   -.017653   .0330632    -0.53   0.606    -.0924472    .0571411 
        _cons |   1.492424   .0902954    16.53   0.000     1.288161    1.696686 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Table 1b: regression of GDP growth on Mineral rents after Joining EITI 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     155 
                                                       F(  0,     9) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1023 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .84572 
 
                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
  lnGdpGrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnMineralRent |   .0206692   .0263508     0.78   0.453    -.0389405     .080279 
              | 
    Countries | 
         Chad |  -.5248436   .0620831    -8.45   0.000    -.6652853   -.3844018 
        Congo |  -.1856254   .0749553    -2.48   0.035    -.3551861   -.0160648 
       Guinea |  -.6084247    .093136    -6.53   0.000     -.819113   -.3977364 
         Mali |  -.5511622   .0736076    -7.49   0.000    -.7176741   -.3846504 
   Mozambique |   .3496335   .0843794     4.14   0.003      .158754    .5405129 
        Niger |  -.3032804   .0224747   -13.49   0.000    -.3541216   -.2524392 
     Tanzania |  -.1771388   .0165312   -10.72   0.000    -.2145348   -.1397427 
         Togo |   -.477656   .0542453    -8.81   0.000    -.6003674   -.3549447 
 Sierra Leone|  -.1874077   .0031274   -59.92   0.000    -.1944825    -.180333 
              | 
        _cons |    1.73744   .0389463    44.61   0.000     1.649337    1.825543 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
Table 2a: regression of Government Expenditure on Education on Mineral rents before joining EITI 
 
       
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      82 
                                                       F(  1,     9) =    0.10 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.7554 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0067 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .30462 
 
                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
 lnGovtExpEdu |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnMineralRent |   .0080756   .0251438     0.32   0.755    -.0488037    .0649549 
        _cons |   1.192129   .0994018    11.99   0.000     .9672669    1.416992 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Table 2b: regression of Government Expenditure on Education on Mineral rents after joining EITI 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      90 
                                                       F(  0,     9) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7429 
                                                       Root MSE      =    .169 
 
                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
 lnGovtExpEdu |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnMineralRent |   .0490496   .0155137     3.16   0.012     .0139551    .0841441 
              | 
    Countries | 
         Chad |  -.5123316   .0717252    -7.14   0.000    -.6745853   -.3500779 
        Congo |  -1.125242   .0291871   -38.55   0.000    -1.191267   -1.059216 
       Guinea |  -.6134006   .0215531   -28.46   0.000    -.6621572    -.564644 
         Mali |   -.111672   .0033553   -33.28   0.000    -.1192622   -.1040818 
   Mozambique |    .320667   .0823516     3.89   0.004     .1343748    .5069591 
       Niger  |  -.0191659   .0550549    -0.35   0.736    -.1437086    .1053769 
     Tanzania |  -.0270883   .0381722    -0.71   0.496    -.1134398    .0592633 
         Togo |   .0387308   .0141833     2.73   0.023     .0066459    .0708157 
Sierra Leone |  -.3285297   .0351653    -9.34   0.000    -.4080791   -.2489804 
              | 
        _cons |   1.418136   .0116973   121.24   0.000     1.391675    1.444597 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 3a: regression of gross capital Formation on Mineral rents before joining EITI 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     160 
                                                       F(  1,     9) =    0.02 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.9036 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0003 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .46491 
 
                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
lnGrossCapi~m |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnMineralRent |  -.0025105   .0201458    -0.12   0.904    -.0480834    .0430624 
        _cons |   2.881202   .1096059    26.29   0.000     2.633256    3.129148 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
Table 3b: regression of gross capital Formation on Mineral rents after joining EITI 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     172 
                                                       F(  0,     9) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.5701 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .32324 
 
                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
lnGrossCapital|      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnMineralRent |   .0762081   .0187937     4.05   0.003     .0336937    .1187225 
              | 
    Countries | 
          Chad|    .295057   .0442784     6.66   0.000     .1948922    .3952218 
        Congo |   -.995327   .0382166   -26.04   0.000    -1.081779   -.9088751 
       Guinea |  -.5378345   .0667654    -8.06   0.000    -.6888682   -.3868008 
         Mali |  -.2860867   .0485805    -5.89   0.000    -.3959834   -.1761899 
   Mozambique |      .3005   .0601238     5.00   0.001     .1644906    .4365093 
       Niger  |  -.0232746   .0211819    -1.10   0.300    -.0711914    .0246421 
     Tanzania |   .0222119   .0117902     1.88   0.092    -.0044594    .0488833 
         Togo |  -.4069655   .0237449   -17.14   0.000    -.4606803   -.3532508 
Sierra Leone |  -.8468043   .0020626  -410.55   0.000    -.8514703   -.8421383 
              | 
        _cons |   3.267375    .027777   117.63   0.000     3.204539    3.330211 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 4a: regression of Health Expenditure on Mineral rents before Joining EITI 
 
 
    Linear regression                                      Number of obs = 146 
                                                       F(  1,     9) =    0.05 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.8342 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0020 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .39248 
 
                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
  lnHealthExp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnMineralRent |  -.0056936   .0264156    -0.22   0.834    -.0654499    .0540627 
        _cons |   1.638781    .126557    12.95   0.000     1.352489    1.925072 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
Table 4b: regression of Health Expenditure on Mineral rents after joining EITI 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     158 
                                                       F(  0,     9) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8362 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .16048 
 
                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
  lnHealthExp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnMineralRent |    .046158   .0125359     3.68   0.005     .0177999    .0745161 
              | 
    Countries | 
          Chad|  -.3957679   .0295347   -13.40   0.000    -.4625801   -.3289557 
         Congo|  -.6681803   .0261106   -25.59   0.000    -.7272466   -.6091141 
        Guinea|   -.698703   .0438667   -15.93   0.000    -.7979363   -.5994697 
         Mali |  -.0412453   .0324043    -1.27   0.235     -.114549    .0320583 
   Mozambique |   .0981225   .0393502     2.49   0.034     .0091062    .1871387 
        Niger |   .1330606   .0141288     9.42   0.000      .101099    .1650222 
      Tanzania|  -.2623624   .0073324   -35.78   0.000    -.2789495   -.2457754 
         Togo |  -.0278749   .0189924    -1.47   0.176    -.0708386    .0150888 
Sierra Leone |   .6259925   .0069572    89.98   0.000     .6102543    .6417306 
              | 
        _cons |   1.868191   .0185279   100.83   0.000     1.826278    1.910104 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 5a: Regression of Manufacturing Value-Added on Mineral Rents before Joining EITI 
 
 
  Linear regression                                      Number of obs =   149 
                                                       F(  1,     8) =    0.01 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.9093 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0008 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .76604 
 
                                      (Std. Err. adjusted for 9 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
lnManuValue~d |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnMineralRent |  -.0069658   .0592542    -0.12   0.909    -.1436062    .1296747 
        _cons |   1.957548    .199949     9.79   0.000     1.496465    2.418631 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5b: Regression of Manufacturing Value-Added on Mineral Rents after Joining EITI 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     158 
                                                       F(  0,     8) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7875 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .35301 
 
                                      (Std. Err. adjusted for 9 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
lnManuValue~d |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnMineralRent |  -.0129079   .0203864    -0.63   0.544    -.0599191    .0341033 
              | 
    Countries | 
        Chad  |   -2.40827   .0480309   -50.14   0.000    -2.519029    -2.29751 
        Congo |   .3504872    .043208     8.11   0.000     .2508493    .4501251 
        Guinea|  -.6775673   .0724234    -9.36   0.000     -.844576   -.5105585 
   Mozambique |   .2048515    .065219     3.14   0.014     .0544562    .3552467 
        Niger |  -.6240143    .022977   -27.16   0.000    -.6769993   -.5710293 
    Tanzania  |  -.2894678   .0127894   -22.63   0.000    -.3189602   -.2599754 
        Togo  |  -.2534802   .0257572    -9.84   0.000    -.3128765    -.194084 
 Sierra-Leone |  -1.074412   .0032565  -329.93   0.000    -1.081921   -1.066902 
              | 
        _cons |   2.356032    .030131    78.19   0.000      2.28655    2.425515 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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